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ALIENS-STATUS OF ALIEN WIVES OF CITIZENS-An unmarried woman,
a native of the Azore Islands, a race eligible to citizenship, was found to have
been at the time of her entry into the United States of constitutional psycho-
pathic inferiority. While proceedings to deport her were pending, she mar-
ried a citizen of the United States. Held: Her marriage did not affect the
applicability of the pertinent provisions of the immigration statutes. Gomez
v. Nagle, 6 Fed. (2d) 52o (C. C. A., 1925).
The nationality of women was unaffected by marriage at common law.
Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Peters 242 (U. S., 1830). I PIGGOTT, NATIONALITY, 57.
But a woman, who might herself be lawfully naturalized, by marriage to a
citizen was deemed to be a citizen of the United States; Act of 1855, 10 Stat.
6o4, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 3948; and could not be excluded, nor de-
ported, under the immigration laws. Hopkins v. Fachant, i3o Fed. 839 (C.
C. A., i9o4) ; Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449 (D. C., 1914) ; United States v.
Tod, 285 Fed. 523 (C. C. A., 1922). See 32 YALE L. J. 84o. However, the
Act of 1922, 42 Stat. i02I, provides that an alien woman who marries a citizen
of the United States shall not become a citizen by reason of such marriage;
but, if eligible to citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and complete
compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws. In Dorto v.
Clark, 300 Fed. 568 (D. C., 1924), it was held that under this act a new class of
aliens-the alien wives of American citizens-has been created, the compen-
satory provision giving a right to become naturalized, and that since this class
did not exist at the time of the passage of the Immigration Act of February
5, 1917, U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. i919) § 42893/4, such a class was not con-
templated and hence did not come under its provisions. See 5 BOSTON UNIV. L.
REv. 133. The tlecision of the present case is based on the ground that
to hold the immigration laws inapplicable to alien wives of American citizens
would defeat the policy of Congress to prevent the introduction and retention
in the United States of the undesirable aliens excluded by the Act of x917,
supra. The existence of a special right to become naturalized was denied, and
it would seem that the right of an alien wife of an American citizen is no
greater than that of any other alien. See C. A. Enslow, The Alien Deporta-
tion Law, i8 LAw. & BANK. 146.
BANKRUPTCY-JUDICIAL NoTicE OF PENDING APPLICATION FOR DIscHARGE
-A petitioner had in i915 filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and within
the statutory period he applied for discharge. A report of the referee recom-
mending that a discharge be denied, was filed, but was not acted upon by the
court. In November, 1922, a second voluntary petition was filed. An appli-
cation for discharge was filed under this second petition and the referee
recommended a discharge. Held: A bankruptcy court may on its own initia-
tive take judicial notice of a pending application for discharge and thus deny
a discharge requested in a second application in respect to the creditors in-
cluded in the first petition. Freshman v. Atkins, Supreme Court of the United
States, November i6, 1925.
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While cases and text-writers say little as to the right of a trial court
so to act, it would seem clear that such a right exists. Appellate courts have
so acted. Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37 (z875); Cluggish v. Koon, 15 Ind. App.
6og, 43 N. E. 161 (x896). Since with regard to matters of evidence the trial
court's authority is as extensive as that of the appellate court, it would follow
that if a matter is subject to judicial notice, the lower court may also con-
sider it on its own initiative.
The pending discharge was a part of the court's record, of which it might
take judicial notice. In In re Sussman, i9o Fed. IxII (D. C., 1gr1), and In re
Loughram, 218 Fed. 621 (C. C. A., 1z4), where prior discharge had been
denied, the courts asserted that they might take judicial notice of their own
records and act upon the facts there disclosed. In Bienville Water Co. v. Mo-
bile, z86 U. S. 212 (xgoz), the court took judicial notice of former proceed-
ings in that court by one of the parties to the present suit, though the point
in issue was not res judicata. In Louisville Trust Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 76
Fed. 296 (C. C. A., 1896), the court took judicial notice of pendency of an-
other suit in the same court.
From these cases it seems that the court followed the usual rule in ap-
proving the action of the lower court in taking the judicial notice of its own
records and of the pending application therein revealed.
BOUNDARIEs-STATE JURISDICTION OvER COASTAL FisHoES-The state
of Washington sought to exercise jurisdiction over coastal fisheries adjacent
to its coast line, within one marine league. The relator petitioned for a writ
of prohibition to restrain the exercise of such jurisdiction. Held: Writ de-
nied. Luketa v. Pollock, 239 Pac. 8 (Wash., 1925).
It has long been established that the state may exercise jurisdiction over
animals ferae nature found within its territorial limits. This is a right inherent
in sovereignty. Corfield t. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 (U. S. C. C., 1825);
State v. Tower, 84 Me. 444, 24 AUt. 898 (1892); Dunham v. Lamphere, 69
Mass. 268 (1855). The siumdness of the instant case, therefore, seems to de-
pend upon the question of whether the territorial limits of the state extend one
marine league out to sea. The constitution of the state of Washington ex-
pressly provides in Article 24 that its boundaries shall extend one marine
league out to sea. This provision would, of course, be void if in contravention
to the federal Constitution. But the latter document makes no mention of
state boundaries extending to sea. It would seem that, if it had been intended
that this area was to be reserved to the national government, such provision
would have been made in Art. x, sec. 8, where are listed the places over which
Congress shall have exclusive jurisdiction. Nor could it have been the inten-
tion of the framers of the Constitution to include this body of water under
the category of "territory" within the meaning of *Art. 4, sec. 3, since those
living on islands a short distance off the coast would thereby be disfranchised
so far as their rights as state citizens were concerned.
The courts seem to have assumed that the territory of coastal states ex-
tends one marine league to sea, and state jurisdiction over this area has been
recognized. See Manchester i. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 264 (x89o). It
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was impliedly recognized in United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336 (U. S.,
1818), where it was held that the cessation of maritime and admiralty juris-
diction over this area was not a cessation of residuary jurisdiction. The state
having jurisdiction over this area, it would seem that its coastal counties
extend one marine league out to sea also. Mahler v. Transportation Co., 35
N. Y. 352 (1866).
It seems, therefore, that the state's assumption of jurisdiction over that
area along its coast line extending one marine league out to sea is in har-
mony with the existent law, and that the decision of the instant case is a
correct one.
CHARITIES-DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATIoN-AcTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF STATE
OF INCORPORATIO-The Meadville Theological School, founded for the edu-
cation of candidates for the Unitarian ministry, specified in its charter that
it was to be located at Meadville and was to be managed by a self-perpetuating
board of trustees with the power to "acquire or dispose of any interest of the
school if it seems beneficial for them to do so, and transact all and any business
as fully and effectually as any person has the right to manage his own con-
cerns . . . as may be necessary to carry the object of the school fully into
effect." Due to the school's distance from any great university, and conse-
quent lack of students, an experiment was undertaken by establishing an exten-
sion summer school at Chicago. This proving successful, the board decided
to move the school to Chicago, incorporating it under Illinois laws and trans-
ferring all assets of the Pennsylvania corporation to the new one. The dis-
senting trustees and others filed a bill to enjoin this. Held: The trustees can-
not dissolve the corporation and hand its assets over without leave of court.
They have a right, however, to extend their activities to another jurisdiction,
i. e., to educate students in Illinois. Hempstead v. Meadville Theological School,
284 Pa. 147, 13o Atl. 421 (1925).
The great weight of authority supports the decision that a corporation
cannot dissolve itself, through its trustees, without consent of the state, whose
consent was required to form it. In re Federal Contracting Co., 212 Fed. 688
(C. C. A., 1914) ; Stinson v. Cedar Grove Cemetery Co., 40 Atl. 316 (N. J.,
z898) ; Boston Glass Manufactory v. Langdon, 24 Pick. 49 (Mass., 1834). The
exception sometimes made for strictly private corporations in which the public
has absolutely no interest, obviously does not apply here. Merchants' & Plant-
ers' Line v. Wagner, 71 Ala. 58i (1882); Chilhowee Woolen Mills v. State,
i15 Tenn. 266, 89 S. W. 741 (i9o5). As the principal case points out, the
authority given to the trustees, wide as it is, was not given to destroy the very
institution for whose interest they were appointed.
An early Pennsylvania case is opposed to the second proposition of the
court-that the school may extend its activities to other jurisdictions; Method-
ist Church v. Remington, I Watts 218 (Pa., 1832) ; based on a fear of clerical
monopoly that seems to have completely left modern courts, and definitely over-
ruled in Evangelical Association's Appeal, 35 Pa. 36 (186o). More recent
Pennsylvania cases uniformly hold that a corporation may act, through its
agents, in other jurisdictions, on the ground of comity and commercial policy.
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Derry Council v. State Council, 197 Pa. 413, 47 At. 208 (Igoo); Re Kimber-
ly's Estate, 249 Pa. 469, 9s AtI. 86 (191S). Other jurisdictions support this
view on the same grounds. Whickey v. Hume, 7 H. L. Cas. 124 (Eng., 1858) ;
Oregonian Ry. v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 Fed. 277 (C. C., i886); Santa
Clara Academy v. Sullivan, xi6 Ill. 375, 6 N. E. 183 (x886). The natural
exception to such rule would be where the charter shows an opposite intention.
The location given in the charter is not the eipression of such intention for it
indicates where the corporate functions are to be performed-not where the
work will be done. Mount Sharon Cemetery Charter, 277 Pa. 79, 12o Ad. 700
(z923). And it is generally accepted that unless the extension is expressly
forbidden, the wide authority granted to the trustees permits them to do this
in the exercise of their sound discretion. Hervey v. Illinois Midland Ry.,
28 Fed. I69 (C. C., 1884); N. Y. Floating Derrick Co. v. N. J. Oil Co., 3 Duer
648 (N. Y. Super., x854).
CONsTrI , oNAL LAW-RERoACTIvE TAX STATUTES--The North Dakota
Act taxing the capital stock of banks was repealed in xgig. Taxes were as-
sessed in 192o, rzoi and 1922, although no taxing statute was in force during
those years, and the majority of banks agreed to pay an amount equal to fifty
per centum of the assessment under the repealed act. In 1923, the legislature
passed a law purporting to validate the unauthorized assessments, the second
section of which authorized a compromise of the original assessments on the
terms of the agreement already entered into by the banks. This section was
repealed by referendum to a general election. The plaintiff, as receiver of a
bank which had not entered into the original compromise, sought to enjoin the
collection of taxes under the new Act. Held: Injunction granted. Baird v.
Burke County, 2o5 N. W. 17 (N. D., 1925).
In the absence of constitutional provision to that effect, retroactive laws
are not per se unconstitutional. The majority of retroactive laws which are
not ex post facto either impair the obligation of contracts or come within the
scope of the "due process" clause. A law such as that in the instant case cannot
be brought within either of those provisions, and the question arises as to
whether any restraint may be imposed on such enactments.
The tax statutes of the United States, especially the Income Tax Law of
1913, have frequently assessed taxes for periods immediately prior to the pas-
sage of the Act, and no serious question as to their constitutionality has been
raised. Stockdale v. Insurance Co., 20 Wall. 323 (U. S., 1873). See Billings
v. U. S., 232 U. S. 26!, 282 (1914); Brushaber v. Union Pacific, 240 U. S.
1, 26 (1g9s).
The court in the instant case, while holding the statute void on other
grounds, strongly intimated that it would, if necessary, hold such a law un-
constitutional. While the fact that the tax was assessed for a three year period
shows the extent to which it is possible to go in wielding the tax power, it is
difficult to see upon what basis its constitutionality could be attacked aside from
those abstract principles of "natural justice" which are sometimes invoked in
such cases. For a similar dictum, see Bank v. Covington, 103 Fed. 523, 527
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(C. C., xgoo). For a discussion between Mr. McMurtrie and Mr. Lewis on
the power to declare statutes unconstitutional when they conflict with no
express constitutional provision, see 41 AM. L. REG. , 594, 78, 971, 064, x093.
CONTRIBUTION-STATUTORY LzLmmT Or OFFicERs FOR COmPORATE DMTS--
A personal judgment for a corporate debt was given against the president of
a corporation, under a statute making corporation officers personally and indi-
vidually liable for corporation debts upon failure to file certain corporation
reports. The statute also provided a maximum fine of $5oo. The president
then sued for contribution other officers equally at fault. Held: Judgment for
defendants. Nettles v. Alexander, 275 S. W. 708 (Ark., i925).
The weight of authority seems to hold that there can be no contribution
in this situation, where the statute is construed as a penal statute. The Hud-
son, I5 Fed. I62 (D. C., 1883) ; Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 173 (1876) ; Hill
v. Frazier, 22 Pa. 32o (1853); 2 THOMPSON, CoaoRAn oSs (2d ed.) § x367.
In Wiles v. Suydam, supra, the penalty is said to be one "imposed for neglect
of duty in not filing a report showing the condition of the company.! In that
case the statute did not impose a fine. In the principal case the court said
there could be no contribution because the statute provided for a fine, which
made it a criminal statute, so that the plaintiff, in proving his case, proved a
violation of the criminal law of the state.
On the other hand, in the absence of a fine, some courts have construed
such statutes as remedial, instead of penal, and have allowed contribution.
Nickerson v. Wheeler, 18 Mass. 295 (1875) (where the intent of the statute
was held to be to secure the making of the proper certificates and also to benefit
creditors).
Another class of cases, also recognizing a distinction, in allowing contri-
bution among tort-feasors differentiates between acts mala prohibita and acts
mala in se, and allows contribution in the former situation. Gas Co. v. Dist. of
Col., 161 U. S. 327 (x895). See Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 4o Mass. 24,
32 (1839).
Ualess the statute is of a criminal nature it would seem that the better
view is to consider such statutes as remedial in their nature, and to allow con-
tribution where the officer has been guilty only of negligence in failing to
file the reports.
DAMAGES-RATE OF EXcHANGE AS BASIS oF CoMPUTATIo-The defend-
ant agreed to establish a credit of 2,000,000 lei in Bucharest for the plaintiff
by a certain date. He failed to do so until later, when lei had depreciated in
value. Plaintiff accepted the credit and sought the amount of depreciation
as damages for the delay. Held: No recovery. Richard v. American Union
Bank, 241 N. Y. 163, 149 N. E. 338 (925).
The court held this contract one to be performed in Bucharest, so that the
breach occurred there and damages were to be measured by Roumanian cur-
rency. The plaintiff received 2,oooooo lei and was not damaged because lei
measured by lei cannot depreciate in value.
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It seems quite clear, however, that the plaintiff suffered actual loss and
that damages should compensate for the loss suffered. By accepting belated
performance he was in possession of less purchasing power than he contracted
for. The value of the stipulated and of the belated performance is determined
by the value of the lei. The difference between the two values represents the
loss suffered.
Foreign money must be regarded not only as a standard of value but, in
fixing its value in relation to our currency, as a commodity. SS. Celia v. SS.
Volturno, [i921] A. C. SU; British-American Bank re Legois Claim, [1922]
2 Ch. 589. SEDowicx, DAMAGES (gth Ed.) §§ 273, 274. And it is eettled that
in an action for failure to deliver lei in Roumania the value of the lei would
be determined by converting lei into dollars at the rate of exchange prevailing
on the date of breach. De Ferdinando v. Simon, Smith & Co., [192O] 3 K. B.
409; SS. Celia v. SS. Volturno, supra; Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.
Y. 37, 138 N. E. 497 (1923).
Since the rate of exchange is used to determine the value of lei in case
of non-performance, it would seem logical to determine likewise the value of
belated performance. Then the difference between the value of stipulated
and of belated performance so fixed would be the damage suffered. In accord
with this view is Hicks v. Guinnes, Supreme Court of the United States, No-
vember x6, x925.
DIvoxC---JuMasmcTION-RsENcE AND Domic -E-A statute conferring
jurisdiction to grant divorces required the plaintiff to have "continuously re-
sided" within the state for three years. The plaintiff contended that the word
"resided" was synonymous with "been domiciled" and that the court had juris-
diction if he was domiciled in the state, though he spent only a few days there
each year. Bill dismissed for want of jurisdiction and plaintiff appealed. Held:
Bill properly dismissed. Morgan v. Morgan, 130 At!. 254 (ConM., i925).
Domicile is a more extensive term than residence. Residence means per-
sonal presence in a fixed and permanent abode, while to constitute domicile
an intention to remain in that place is essential in addition to residence. Bouv.
L. D., 2920; CyCLoPnic L. D., 325; i9 C. J. 395.
In divorce statutes, "residence" is generally regarded as equivalent to
"domicile." Harrison v. Harrison, 117 Md. 607, 84 AtL 57 (i92) ; Barber v.
Barber, 89 Misc. 5i9, x5i N. Y. Supp. io64 (i915); Connolly v. Connolly, 33
S. D. 346, 146 N. W. 58z (1914). The additional element of intent to remain
is required in order to prevent an abuse of the state's divorce laws by trans-
ients. The court in the instant case, however, requires an actual residence
as distinguished from a domicile, adopting the view of several states which
rather seem to fear the abuse of their divorce laws by domiciled inhabitants,
who do not reside continuously in the place of their domicile. Tipton v. Tip-
ton, 87 Ky. 243, 8 S. W. 44o (1888) ; Michael v. Michael, 34 Tex. Civ. App.
63o, 79 S. W.-74 (x9o4). See Beale, Residence and Domicil, 4 IowA L. BuLL.
3, 8. These courts rather seem to require continuous physical presence and
do not give domicile and residence their usual interpretation, according to
which domicile includes residence.
RECENT CASES
The Pennsylvania decisions hold that the statute requires a permanent
residence with domiciliary intent, but also that a domiciliary intent not ac-
companied by an actual, bona fide residence does not give jurisdiction to the
courts. Dulin v. Dulin, 33 Pa. Super. 4 (i9o7); Lake v. Lake, 70 Pa. Super.
22o (1918) ; Gearing v. Gearing, 83 Pa. Super. 423 (1924). This attitude in-
dicates accord with the instant case.
IN sTATE Co mERc-ANTI-TRusT Acr-LocA. VxoLzc,--Members of
a local union during a strike destroyed certain non-union mines. Testimony
indicated that the purpose of the leaders was to enhance prices in interstate
markets for the benefit of union mines. Held: Evidence upon which a jury
might properly find a conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce. Cor6nado
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 28 U. S. 295 (1925).
Coal mining is not interstate commerce; D. L. & W. R. v. Yurkonis, 238
U. S. 439 (1915) ; see Kidd v. Pearson, 28 U. S. 1, 21 (1888) ; and ordinary
disturbances are local state matters. See United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 4z,
45 (U. S., 1869) ; Hammer V. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 274 (19x8). Cf. United
Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (T922). But when such
local matters are conducted with intent to restrain interstate commerce and
to enhance prices in interstate markets, they come within the purview of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 210, U. S. Cmp. Stat. § 8820. Montague
& Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38 (x9o3) ; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S.
375 (19o5).
A conspiracy to restrict interstate traffic in cotton, and thereby artificially
enhance the price in interstate markets, is within the terms of the Anti-Trust
Act; United States v. Patton, 226 U. S. 525 (913); although dealing in, or
the production of, the commodity is not interstate commerce. Ware v. Mobile
County, 209 U. S. 405 (i9o8); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 26o U. S.
245 (ign). In the principal case, the violence was local, but the purpose was
to enhance the price of coal in interstate markets. The prevention of such
conspiracies is the aim of the Anti-Trust Act. Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 22 U. S. 1 (1gn). The holding of the court is therefore in accord
with well settled precedents, and substantiated by sound public policy.
JuRISDcrioN-AcioN AGAINST GovnRxmz.--Surr To RicovEs FniE IL-
Lrwai.my Imposu--Action was brought in a United States District Court under
Judicial Code of March 3, 191z, c. 231, § 24, par. 2o, to recover from the United
States a sum of money paid as a fine imposed under a statute that was subse-
quently declared unconstitutional. Upon a motion to dismiss the complaint be-
cause it sounded in tort and was consequently outside the jurisdiction of the
Court. Held: The court has jurisdiction. Sultzbach Clothing Co. v. United
States, United States District Court of New York, Western District, October
23, 1925.
If the action had sounded in tort, the court would have had no jurisdiction;
Langford v. United States, zoi U. S. 341 (I879); United States v. Neder-
landsCh, 254 U. S. 148 (1g2o) ; for the United States can be sued only with
its permission, which is not given in cases sounding in tort. Judicial Code of
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1911, C. 231, § 24, par. 2o; 36 Stat. xo93; U. S. Compiled Statutes, § 991 (2o).
In the principal case, however, the court said that if there was a tort element,
the plaintiff had the right to waive it and sue on the implied contract to repay
the fine if it were unlawfully exacted. There is authority for this view. United
States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co., I12 U. S. 645 (1884); Great Falls
Manufacturing Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U. S. 581 (x888). In many
cases recovery has been permitted on implied contracts. U. S. v. Lynah, 188
U. S. 445 (i9o3); United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U. S. 228 (1914).
It has even been said by a court that a fine illegally imposed is held by the
government as a deposit and may be sued for on the implied promise to repay.
Devlin's Case, 12 Ct. Cl. 266 (1876).
Thus is created a situation which at first glance seems illogical. If a man
is fined illegally by the government he may recover his money; but if he is
imprisoned illegally, he is not permitted to bring suit against the government
for damages. Devlin's Case, supra; United States v. Rothstein, 187 Fed. 268
(C. C. A., 1911); Basso v. United States, 239 U. S. 6o2 (gxq6). But the rea-
son for the distinction is plain. The government cannot be sued without its
consent, and in the section of the Judicial Code cited above, it has permitted
suits to be brought on implied contracts, whereas it has expressly withheld
its consent in cases sounding in tort.
JrxnusDIcTIoN-INJUNCrIoN-RIGHT TO RESTRAIN FROSt DOING Acrs Our-
SIDE TznrrOa.L JusasDicrroN-The international bridge over the Niagara
River is owned by an American and a Canadian corporation, each owning from
the shore to the international boundary line in the middle of the stream. The
corporations leased the railway floor of the bridge to the Grand Trunk Railway,
and when the lessee violated the terms of the lease the bridge companies sought
an injunction in a New York court to restrain further violation of the terms
of the contract Held: Injunction granted. Niagara Falls International Bridge
Co. v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 24z N. Y. 85, r48 N. E. 797 (1925).
In its effect the decision seems to present startling possibilities-a New
York court forbids a Canadian corporation from doing certain acts in Canada
(since half the bridge was on Canadian soil). The symptoms of heresy, how-
ever, are more apparent than real.
If the international coloring is extracted from the problem its solution
presents little difficulty. It is generally accepted that courts of equity will
enforce contracts even though they may deal with land outside the jurisdiction
of the courts; Groom v. Mortimer Land Co., z92 Fed. 849 (C. C. A., 1912);
Monnett v. Turpin, 132 Ind. 482, 32 N. E. 328 (z892); or even though the title
to land not within its territorial limits is affected. Manley v. Carter, 7 Kan.
App. 86, 52 Pac- 9r5 (x898). In all these cases, including the principal case,
the court had, of course, personal jurisdiction.
In the instant case the court of equity not only goes beyond its terri-
torial limits with its injunction, but enters into the territory of an independent
sovereign state. But every consideration of comity requires that it should.
The use to which any portion of the bridge is put affects the whole; the lease
was made for the entire bridge. The restraining on-one-half of the bridge of
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acts permtted on the other half would be as ineffective as it is ludicrous. No
question of a conflict with the laws of Canada is raised because the purpose
of the injunction is to prevent a violation of the terms of a lease which the
Canadian Government authorized.
This is not the first decision in which the jurisdiction of equity has ex-
tended outside of the country. In the Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 79a (C. C.
A., igo9), the defendant was restrained from diverting the waters of the Colo-
rado River in Mexico because it caused injury to the plaintiff in Arizona. In
order to obey this injunction the defendant was required to perform positive
acts, the order therefore going further than that in the present case. In-com-
menting on that case, Mr. Beale considers it rightly decided. "The relief
asked is an injunction and, as has been seen, an injunction may always be
granted against doing an act abroad.' Beale, Jurisdiction of Courts over For-
eigners, 26 H~uv. L REv. 292, 29s.
It has already been observed that the holding in the instant case recom-
mends itself for practical reasons. It is also to be noted that it is not without
the support of authority.
LmiBN--EQurrA=, RIGHT To FoLLwW MisAopiATED Fu s--De-
fendant, president of a corporation, drew a sum of money over and above his
salary and used this sum to improve his house. Both the defendant and the
company shortly thereafter were declared insolvent. The trustee in bankruptcy
of the company sought a decree declaring a lien on the defendant's house for
the sum withdrawn. Held: An equitable lien exists. Jones v. Carpenter, Su-
preme Court of Florida, October 24, x925.
A court of equity will declare that a lien exists where the general prin-
ciples of justice require it, in accordance with the familiar doctrines that
equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy, or that equity will
regard that as done which ought to be done. Westall v. Wood, 212 Mass. 540,
99 N. E. 32s (x1) ; Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 84 N. F. 937 (19o8).
See Vidal v. South American Securities Co., 276 Fed. 855, 870 (C. C. A., i9n).
Fraud on the part of the defendant is an additional reason for decreeing a lien.
Green v. MacDonald, 75 Vt. 93, 53 AtL 332 (1902). Where there is a suf-
ficient remedy at law, or no grounds for equitable relief, a lien will not be
created. Gray v. Hudson River Electric Power Co., i9o Fed. 773 (C. C.,
x9ii) ; Richards v. Arms Shingle Co., 74 Mich. 57, 41 N. W. 86o (1889).
Hence an equitable lien arises when one innocently and in good faith im-
proves the property of another and no remedy at law exists; Haggarty v. Mc-
C=an, 25 N. J. Eq. 48 (1874); cases cited in 31 C. J. 342; or when one pays
off claims existing against the property of another at the latter's request,
express or implied. Winks v. Hassall, 9 B. & C. 372, (Eng., 1829); Fowler
v. Parsons, 143 Mass. 4ox, 9 N. E. 799 (1886). A fortiori, if money has been
improperly obtained and appropriated to any other shape, equity will give a
lien thereon. Red Bird Realty Co. v. South, 96 Ark. 28r, 131 S. W. 34o
(191o); Hubbard v. Stapp, 32 I1. App. 54 (x889); Storm v. McGrover, z8g
N. Y. S68, 82 N. F. 16o (1907).
It is therefore submitted that the instant case is in accord with both
the spirit and the letter of the rules governing equitable liens.
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NEGIGEzNcE-ATRAcTwE NuISANcE-TRESPASSING ANim.Ls-The state-
ment alleged that defendant placed poison on its right of way to kill weeds,
knowing the odor and taste to be attractive to cattle. Plaintiff's cows broke
down fence in adjoining field, ate poison, and died. Held: Statement showed
cause of action, on theory of attractive nuisance. Hagey v. R. R., 6 Pa. D. &
C. 62I (1924).
For the general theory of attractive nuisance, see Jeremiah Smith, Liability
of Landowners to Children, ii HARv. L. REv. 349.
In Pennsylvania, the Act of I889, P. L. 27, repealed the Act of 17oo, § I,
x Sm. L. 13, and restored rights of landowners and owners of cattle as they
existed at common law; Barber v. Mensch, 157 Pa. 390 (1893) ; which imposed
the duty upon every man to keep his cattle within the limits of his own pos-
sessions. Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R., io C. P. io (Eng., 1874). A rail-
road in this state has exclusive possession of its right of way, except at cross-
ings; Buckley v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 275 Pa. 36o, ig At. 413 (1922); and
is not required to fence its right of way. R. R. v. Skinner, xg Pa. 298 (1852);
R. R. v. Rehman, 49 Pa. ioi (1866).
Where the common law is not applicable, the owner has been permitted
to recover. Ry. v. Newman, 94 Ark. 459, z27 S. W. 735 (igIO), holding the
common law rule as to trespass of cattle not law in that state; Brown v. R. R.,
27 Mo. App. 394 (1887), where it was changed by statute. But even where
cattle were allowed to run at large, it was held there could be no recovery for
the death of cattle attracted by salt placed on switches. Kirk v. R. R., 41 W.
Va. 722, 24 S. F_ 639 (x896).
Liability for causing the death of trespassing animals arises where a per-
son intentionally set a trap for the purpose. Townsend v. Wathen, 9 East 277
(Eng., x8o8); Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. i (1839). Even in the absence
of such intention, there may be liability by negligently maintaining a danger-
ous substance upon one's land with knowledge that trespassing animals are
attracted thereby, depending upon the circumstances. Hess v. Lupton, 7 Ohio
216 (1835).
The rule of attractive *nuisance in cases of infant trespassers is based upon
an implied invitation, which seems ill-placed in the case of animals. It is
doubtful whether it is necessary to extend the rule, or to classify under the
doctrine of "attractive nuisance" an entirely separate rule of negligence.
NunuuNcE--CAaRRs's LIABILrrY TO PASSENGER-IMPLIED INVITATION TO
ALIGHT-The plaintiff was injured in alighting from a car of the defendants'
train which had stopped short of the station platform. Held: Plaintiff pre-
cluded from recovery. Sharpe v. Southern R. R., ['925] 2 K. B. 3X1.
It is universally held that if a passenger has been invited to alight either
impliedly or expressly he may assume that a safe means of alighting has been
provided for him. Younglove v. Pullman Co., 2o7 Fed. 797 (D. C., 1913);
Smithers v. Wilmington City R. R., 22 Del. 422, 67 At. 167 (i9o7). And if the
passenger has been misled by the carrier with reference to the safety of alight-
ing, the carrier will be liable for injuries sustained; B. & 0. S. W. R. R. t
Mullen, 120 IlL App. 88 (I9o5); Lent v. New York C. R. R., I2o N. Y. 467,
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24 N. E. 653 (189o); provided that the passenger has used reasonable care in
availing himself of that invitation. Thompson v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. R.,
189 Fed. 723 (C. C. A., 1g91); Smith v. Georgia Pacific R. R., 88 Ala. 538,
7 So. 19 (z88); Lee v. Boston Elevated R. R., 182 Mass. 454, 65 N. E. 822
(19o3). The court in the principal case held that he had not done so, but was
negligent in not looking where he stepped.
It is also universally held that contributory negligence is a question of
fat for the jury; Texas & Pacific R. R. v. Bigger, 239 U. S. 330, (i91);
Lee v. Boston Elevated R. R., supra; Warren V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R.,
243 Pa. 15, 89 At& 828 (1914); except where only one conclusion may reason-
ably be drawn from the facts, when it is a question of law. Nagle v. California
Southemn R. R., 88 Cal. 86, 25 Pac. 11o6 (891); Morrison v. Erie R. R., s6
N. Y. 3o2 (1874); Kurfess v. Harris, 195 Pa. 385, 46 Atl. 2 (xgoo).
In Glasscock v. London, etc. R. R., 18 Times L. R. 295 (Eng., xgo), it
was held, upon facts similar to those of the principal case, that the jury was
justified in finding that the plaintiff was not negligent in failing to look where
she stepped. It might appear that this is opposed to the holding in the instant
case, but upon analysis it will be found that there is no conflict. The plaintiff
in Glasscock v. London, etc. R. R., supra, had frequently traveled to, and was
thoroughly familiar with, the station at which she was injured. Hence she
had a right to assume that proper accommodations for alighting had been pro-
vided for her, as had always been the case before. The plaintiff in the instant
case, however, had never before alighted at the station at which he was in-
jured, had no such right, and was, therefore, clearly negligent in failing to
examine his means of exit.
Wn.s--MzwrnG OF "Issue" IN STATuT--AoPTm Caumm-A tes-
tator's wife, to whom a legacy was given, died before him, leaving an adopted
son, but no issue. The Wills Act, 1917, § i5 (b, P. L. 4o3, Pa. St. igao, §
83z4, provides that a legacy shall not lapse if the legatee predeceases testator,
leaving issue. Held: An adopted child is not issue within the meaning of the
statute. Ruiseirs Estate, 284 Pa. 164, z3o AtL 319, (1925).
Opposed to the view expressed in the principal case, there is much authority
to the effect that the word issue, as used in similar statutes, includes an adopted
child. The courts reason that the adoption act is founded upon a wise and
beneficent purpose, which should be sustained and promoted by giving the law
a liberal construction. Newman's Estate, 75 Cal. 213, 16 Pac. 887 (1888);
Riley v. Day, 88 Kan. 503, 129 Pac. 524 (913) ; In re Book's Will, 9o N. J.
Eq. $49, io7 Atl. 435 (1919). Other courts agree with the instant case, that
an adopted child is not the issue of the adopting parents within the meaning
of such a statute, and that to allow an adopted child to inherit from the an-
cestors of the adopter would often put property into the hands of adopted
children unlmown to the testator, contrary to his wishes and expectations.
Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N. E. 86o (x889); Morse v. Osborne, 75 N.
H. 487, 77 At]. 403 .(91o); Phillips v. McConica, s9 Ohio 1, 51 N. E. 445
(Ix98).
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It should be noted that Pennsylvania, under its Intestate Act of I97, § 16
(b), P. L 429, 439, Pa. St. 19o, § 8383, gives to adopted persons the rights
of a member of the family of the adopting parents for all purposes of inherit-
ance and of taking by devolution. The Pennsylvania W'dls Act, however, has
no such provisioa as to adopted children. Nevertheless, a lower court, in
Moore's Estate, 30 Pa. Dist. x52 (192z), held directly contrary to the principal
case. It would seem that the construction plated upon the word issue by the
court in the instant case is the correct one. In view of the absence of a general
act giving to adopted children all the rights of those who are natural born, and
under the rule of construction, that where statutes are in derogation of the
common law they should be strictly construed, the word issue should be given
its strict legal meaning, which does not include adopted children.
